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1. National security: Different notions to cover similar or related threats. 
  
“National security” is a very flexible notion that is devoid of a clear definition and that, also, is 
not easily definable in categorical terms1 in so far as it may not remain constant over time. This 
absence of definition is not only due to the objective difficulty to define it but also to the fact that 
states want to have a rather broad and flexible notion that will finally allow them to reach their 
specific goals when referring to it in the specific area targeted. The existence of this nebulous 
situation as regards this notion provides a high level of flexibility to the state but also generates a 
great deal of uncertainty in so far as it may finally permit everyone to label almost whatever policy 
and measure he favours under the heading of “national security”.2  
Additionally, the notion has now expanded both as regards the amount of threats covered and the 
areas where reference to it is made. Indeed, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is becoming one of 
those fields in which the issue of national security is gaining relevance. Although most countries 
are open to FDI, renewed concerns by states as regards the ability to fulfil certain government 
goals and policies or to the preservation of some natural resources, industries or interests has led 
many of them to adopt a more reserved stance in some areas of the economy, especially in cases 
of sovereign FDI.3 On the one hand, the use of certain general exceptions in International 
                                                          
1 WJ MOON, ‘Essential Security Interests in International Investment Agreements’ (2012) 15:2 Journal of 
International Economic Law 481, 500. 
2 A WOLFERS, ‘"National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol’ (1952) 67:4 Political Science Quarterly 481, 481. 
3 Within growing fears about the existence of a real technically based espionage threat in many developed countries by 
companies now belonging to foreign investors, many of them Multinational Enterprises –MNEs- (AE SAFARIAN, 
‘The Canadian Policy Response to Sovereign Direct Investment’ in KP SAUVANT, LE SACHS and WPF SCHMIT 
JONGBLOED (eds), Sovereign Investment. Concerns and Policy Reactions, OUP, Oxford 2012, p 443). The 
acquisition of Lenovo by a Chinese computer manufacturer has given rise to suspicion within the US, in so far as many 
of these computers are used by the US administration. At the same time, even wholly owned national companies have 
branches in foreign countries where components are produced and the risk of infiltration also exists in these cases. See 
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Investment Agreements (IIAS) has grown steadily. Also mechanisms of screening FDI projects 
by governments on “national security” grounds, mainly those focussed on Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&As), have been designed in certain developed and emerging economies and 
some market access rules have been implemented too.  
In addition to the idea of national security, other different notions aimed to apparently cover a 
similar reality –the protection of the host state against some kinds of threats caused by certain 
FDI- are also used when facing non-welcomed FDI: national “essential security interests” or 
“public policy” are two of them. All these terms constitute elastic and highly contextual concepts 
that can be understood in different ways depending on diverse factors: the perception of the threat, 
the set of values to be protected or the means through which these values can be protected are 
some of them.4 This is also referable to the notion of national security, a term to which many of 
the other notions mentioned by national legislations and IIAs are finally linked.5  
Usually, all these terms cover a similar reality or, at least, somehow similar reality: the goal is the 
protection of the essential interests of the host state against some kinds of threats. But this is done 
through the use of notions which are different in their wording and origin and without clearly 
describing in any case what particular interests are to be defended under every heading and from 
what kind of threats the host state should be protected. “National security”, national “essential 
security interests”, “public policy” and related terms can mean different things to different people 
in different moments. And because of this intrinsic relativity they can also serve a range of 
different purposes. Moreover, they may be open to somehow different understandings in domestic 
and international cases.6 
 “National security”, national “essential security interests” and related terms broadly refer to ideas 
about the integrity and power of the state itself as an institutional apparatus.7 Their traditional 
understanding, especially that of national security, has been linked to the safety and protection of 
the people and institutions of a country from military threats, terrorism or espionage. But all of 
them constitute evolving notions that develop at the same time that society does and that, 
consequently, now also relate to cyber espionage, and risks linked to the political, financial or 
economic system of a country, to its socio-cultural basis, to its essential infrastructures or to its 
environment, among other potential areas of impact.8 National security and the essential national 
security interests of the state may also be threatened when certain basic strategic infrastructures 




                                                          
RG BRACKNELL, ‘Trust Not Their Presents, Nor Admit the Horse: Countering the Technically-Based Espionage 
Threat’ (2006-7) 12 Roger Williams University Law Review 832, 837-839. 
4 H NASU, ‘The Expanded Conception of Security and International Law: Challenges to the UN Collective Security 
System’ (2011) 3:3 Amsterdam Law Forum 15, 15. 
5 P LINDSAY, ‘The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure? (2002-3) 52 Duke Law 
Journal 1277, 1297. 
6 W BURKE-WHITE and A VON STADEN, ‘Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and 
Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2008) 48:2 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 307, 360-361. 
7 J WALDRON, ‘Safety and Security’ in E REED and M DUMPER (eds), Civil Liberties, National Security and 
Prospects for Consensus Legal, Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, CUP, Cambridge, 2012, p 14. 
8 UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs, UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for 
Development, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/5, UNCTAD, New York/Geneva 2009, p 7. 
9 M BARBIERI, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds as Protected Investors under BITs and the Safeguard of the National Security 
of Host States’ in G SACERDOTI with P ACCONCI, M VALENTI and A DE LUCA (eds), General Interests of Host 
States in International Investment Law, CUP, Cambridge 2014, p 132. 




2. Exploring the meaning of national security in the field of foreign direct investment. 
Traditionally, when assessing the notion of “national security” or of national “essential security 
interests” and similar terms in the field of FDI, defence industries have been considered very 
relevant and consequently foreign investment has habitually been limited in that sector. Military 
intelligence and espionage have also been key elements in the construction of the understanding 
of these terms as regards FDI. However, these notions have now expanded to include other 
different ideas and threats. In the case of FDI and because of the increase of flows coming from 
emerging countries in developed economies and the consequent threat that they may apparently 
create to them and to their economies, these terms become very broadly understood, 
encompassing ideas and situations that although may have aspects linked to “national security” 
or national “essential security interests” have not been traditionally included in these notions.  
The particular sector where the FDI project is to be implemented as well as the potential harm 
that it can cause are two of the many elements that permit both the construction of these notions 
and the determination of when, and why, a certain FDI project runs against them in a specific host 
state. In the area of FDI these notions now encompass references to economic well-being, to 
energy independence, to control of certain key strategic sectors of the economy or to the necessary 
preservation of certain critical infrastructures, among others, linked to the origin of the 
investment, the nature of the investor and the area targeted by the investment. 
In line with this idea, national security related clauses embodied in IIAs are broadly understood 
to go beyond the traditional military threats.10 Their usual wide wording also point in this 
direction. Support for this position has been explicitly given by some states. For instance, the US 
has provided some guidance in this line during the negotiation of some of its Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs). Thus, the Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the 
Treaty between the United States of America and Mongolia Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, of 1994, considers that reference to “essential security 
interests” embodied in Article X(1) “would include security-related actions taken in time of war 
or national emergency; actions not arising from a state of war or national emergency must have 
a clear and direct relationship to the essential security interest of the Party involved.”11 This 
notion has also been interpreted in the domestic practice of other countries with a tradition of 
negotiating BITs. In India, for instance, the concept of “essential security” is approached as 
equivalent to “security of the State”.12 
 “National security”, national “essential security interests” “public policy” and other related terms 
used in practice are all notions that coincide nowadays in evoking general considerations of 
protecting the security of a state, the safety of its citizens and key aspects of its way of life.13 
However they are not exactly similar, and some different understandings can be afforded to each 
of them, although their exact content is dependent on different factors and may vary in accordance 
to the specific area or in relation to the particular host country in which it is assessed. In any case, 
IIAs and national legislations tend to include no explicit definition of any of these terms, thus 
creating uncertainty and leaving a broad power of interpretation to the parties of the treaty or 
national administrations. 
                                                          
10 Note, W BURKE-WHITE and A VON STADEN, above n 6, 351-352. 
11 Art. X. In similar terms, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Treaty between the United 
States of America and Azerbaijan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Art. XIV. 
12 Note, judgments of the Supreme Court of India in the cases Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of Bihar and Others, 
and Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel of 07.09.1965, [1966] AIR 740, [1966] SCR (1) 709. See W BURKE-WHITE 
and A VON STADEN, above n 6, 353-354. 
13 OECD, Security-Related Terms in International Investment Law and in National Security Strategies, May 2009, 
Paris, OECD 2009, p 3. 





2.1. The elusive and variable notion of national security. 
The understanding of the notion of national security varies depending on the country and the 
moment in which it is approached. In the specific field of investment, national security concerns 
as regards FDI in the US may be primarily related to foreign control over critical infrastructures, 
mostly when the headquarters of the potential acquirer are located in certain countries, either 
competitors or considered unfriendly countries. In the EU, it may be related to the fear of 
domination by investors from certain countries or to the control of certain national champions or 
high level technological industries by foreigners, mainly when they belong to some countries of 
the world. In Russia, fears are directly related to the foreign control over the exploitation of 
national resources or investment in firms controlling certain military know-how.14 On the 
contrary, in the PRC these concerns as regards FDI are linked to the idea of development and, 
therefore, to the control of particular sectors of the economy or strategic industries considered 
essential for the economic development of the country.15  
In addition to that, in those countries which have been affected by terrorism or have a permanent 
terrorist threat, the relationship between national security and FDI has a deep military and 
strategic dimension: the US is a good example. Whereas for other countries like the EU, Japan 
and many developing countries, notions of national security are mostly related to its economic 
dimension and blend with considerations of strategic industries and national champions.16 The 
French Government, for instance, speaks of “economic patriotism”.17 
During the last few decades a change in the perception of security threats has arisen affecting both 
the specific content of the notion of security and its objectives, as well as the ways to address 
these potential threats. The rising awareness about the increasing environmental problems, the 
limited existence of natural resources, the need to ensure the normal functioning of some essential 
critical infrastructures including water and energy supply as the basis for the normal development 
of modern societies or the importance of cyberspace as a basic element of the society and a 
primary arena for conflict play, among others, a relevant role in a securitized society in which the 
understanding of security and national security broadens and affects fields so far not central to 
the notion.18  
All these changes have additionally taken place in a post 9/11 globalized world which is 
increasingly characterized by ideas of threat and fear and by the quest for security, in many cases 
within a securitization framework.19 The final result is that all these concerns extend now to areas 
in which the security dimension has not so far been present or only to a very low or marginal 
degree. Such areas and sectors that are now understood as relevant for the preservation of the 
national security of a country and are reinterpreted in accordance to this goal. FDI seems to be 
one of those sectors that gain a new approach and understanding in this environment and that, 
                                                          
14 JR HEATH, ‘Strategic Protectionism? National Security and Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation’ (2009) 
41 The George Washington International Law Review 101, 117-122. 
15 KP SAUVANT, ‘The regulatory framework for investment: where are we headed?’ in R RAMAMURTI and N 
HASHAI (eds), The Future of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Enterprise, Research in Global 
Strategic Management, Volume 15, Emerald Books, Bingley 2011, p 417; M BARBIERI, above n 9, pp 132-133. 
16 KP SAUVANT, ‘Driving and Countervailing Forces: A Rebalancing of National FDI Policies” (2008-9) Yearbook 
on International Investment Law & Policy 215, 242. 
17 De Villepin stands by calls for ‘economic patriotism’, Financial Times of 22.09.2005.  
18 See JT MATTHEWS, ‘Redefining Security’ (1998-1990) 68 Foreign Affairs 162, 163-171. 
19 As regards the understanding of this concept, note M McDONALD, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’ 
(2008) 14:4 European Journal of International Relations 563, 565-567. And in certain cases of macro-securitization, 
note to this respect, B BUZAN and O WÆVER, ‘Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale 
in securitisation theory’ (2009) 35 Review of International Studies 253, 257-259 & 273. 




consequently, is affected by this new security discourse and is now given a role to play in national 
security and critical infrastructures and protection strategies of the state.20  
This national security dimension of FDI varies from country to country although its seems to be 
increasingly assessed everywhere. For instance, the UK National Security Strategy and Strategic 
Defence and Security Review 2015. A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom makes an explicit 
reference to the national security dimension of FDI when speaking of the investment by China 
into the new Hinkley Point C nuclear power station. It specifically refers to the requirement to 
combine the necessity to attract inwards investors to modernize the UK energy infrastructure thus 
“supporting our longer term energy security” with the necessary assessment “of any national 
security risks, and mitigation.”21 FDI projects -and also FDI law- are now reinterpreted on 
national security grounds. Not only the potential positive impact on the national economy is 
assessed but also a national security analysis is undertaken. What this national security discourse 
means and how it is actually envisaged and implemented in practice is a very relevant issue that 
is already open and subject to different interpretations worldwide. 
At the same time, the growing specialization and the existence of contradictory forces and 
interests in the broad number of sectors affected by the ideas of “security” and of “national 
security” have fostered the need to rethink the definition of national security and to consider 
whether one or different definitions of the term exist depending on the specific area to which its 
meaning is to be addressed: critical infrastructures, energy security, food security, water security 
or so on.22   
In an objective sense security has been defined as a “low probability of damage to acquired 
values”.23 In a subjective sense, very important in the current society of fear and securitization, 
security means “the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”24 And this directly entails 
that the same threat may be understood differently in different moments and places.25  
However, despite all these differences and the absence of a clear definition, the term “national 
security” is considered to have a coherent and internationally understood meaning with some 
commonly accepted principles, and it is generally referred to as the “protection of the nation and 
its citizens against a broad set of threats”.26 Nevertheless it remains a very wide term that permits 
very different outcomes when it is approached on a case by case basis, and which may generate 
problems of understanding when it is used in the area of FDI.  
The determination of the threat from which we need to be protected constitutes a central element 
in the construction of any idea of security and of national security. In the case of FDI the lack of 
a clear definition of the notion of “national security” or any similar term referred to, and the vague 
concepts employed in the several existing national and IIAs security provisions provide states 
with a broad margin of appreciation and allow them to deal with unanticipated national security 
threats.27 But this vagueness may also foster a shift from the idea of protection of the state and of 
                                                          
20 OECD, Building Trust and Confidence in International Investment. Report by countries participating in the 
“Freedom of Investment” Process March 2009, OECD, Paris 2009, p 10. 
21 HM GOVERNMENT, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. A Secure and 
Prosperous United Kingdom, HSO, London 2015, para 4.141 at p 44. 
22 See H NASU, ‘State Secrets Law and National Security’ (2015) 64 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
365, 372. 
23 DA BALDWIN, ‘The Concept of Security’ (1997) 23 Review of International Studies 5, 13, standing on the definition 
provided by WOLFERS, “the absence of threats to acquired values” (A WOLFERS, above n 2, 485). 
24 A WOLFERS, above n 2, 485. 
25 Vid. H NASU, above n 22, 373. 
26 OECD, Interim report approved by the OECD Investment Committee at the fourth OECD Roundtable on Freedom 
of Investment, National Security and “Strategic” Industries on 30 March 2007 (reproduced in OECD, International 
Investment Perspectives: Freedom of Investment in a Changing World, OECD, Paris 2007, p 56. 
27 WJ MOON, above n 1, 500. 




its essential security interests against some vaguely defined threats, to the goal of preservation by 
the state of certain national sectors of the economy and national champions from foreign 
competition or control and, consequently, to the implementation by the state of certain policies 
on hidden restriction of FDI. The UNCTAD Core Principles for Policy Making recognize that 
states have their legitimate reasons to limit foreign investment for national security reasons or “in 
the context of their national development strategies”, which constitutes a much more vague and 
encompassing term.28  
The concept of “national security” and of all those terms related to it is no longer static and in the 
area of FDI pertains to the potential effects arising out of the transition of ownership from national 
to foreign actors, some of them state driven, of critical infrastructures, major energy assets, critical 
technologies and long-term projections of needs for critical resources and material.29 But the 
analysis of all these situations on national security grounds is not only done on purely traditional 
security grounds –for instance, on the basis of the foreign acquirer’s record regarding non-
proliferation and control regimes or national counter-terrorism activities- but from a more 
complex security approach in which traditional ideas of security are combined with economic, 
political or social related security approaches. The consequence is that in some cases it is far from 
easy to actually differentiate between true security concerns and other economic, political or 
geostrategic fears that may be relevant to the FDI host state but are the direct consequence of the 
free market competition in the framework of liberalized international trade.  
To prevent this situation, the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct 
Investment, without prejudice to the general approach of recommended free admission, accepts 
that the host state may –not can-, “as an exception”, refuse admission to a proposed investment 
“which is, in the considered opinion of the state, inconsistent with clearly defined requirements 
of national security”.30 Curiously, this requirement of having clearly security related requirements 
is combined with the acceptance of the possibility for the host state to reject FDI in sectors 
“reserved by the law of the State to its nationals on account of the State's economic development 
objectives or the strict exigencies of its national interest.”31 
 
2.2. Towards a common shared meaning of national security.  
The multidimensionality of security, its multifaceted and complex condition is currently well 
established.32 “Security” and “national security” have traditionally been linked to their military 
dimension and have historically been interpreted as referring to the protection of the legal interests 
of the state against the use of force by other states.33 These notions then have been focussed on 
military national security. Central to these concepts –“security” and “national security”- has been 
the protection of the territory of one nation from external military threats and attacks.34 However, 
the notion has evolved and it has today become much more complex and comprehensive affecting 
                                                          
28 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2015/5, 
UNCTAD, Geneva 2015, p 34. 
29 AE SAFARIAN, above n 3, p 442.  
30 WORLD BANK, World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 
<http://www.italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf> accessed 01.11.2017, No II(4)(i). 
31 Ibid, No II(4)(ii). 
32 H NASU, above n 4, 15; M STONE, Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis, Groupe 
d’Etudes et d’Expertise “Sécurité et Technologies” GEEST-2009, Security Discussion Papers Series 1, Paris, 
Spring’09, p 2. 
33 H KELSEN, ‘Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations’ (1948) 42:4 
The American Journal of International Law 783, 783; H KELSEN, Collective Security under International Law, Naval 
War College New Port Rhode Island, International Law Studies, United States Government Printing Office, 
Washington DC 1957, p 1. 
34 As expressed in Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter. 




also many civilian areas of the society, and refers to critical infrastructures, that in many cases are 
owned or controlled by private individuals, or international trade.35  
A broad understanding of national security as a concept not limited to military or security threats 
is now shared in most countries of the world and has been accepted by some arbitration panels 
which stressed this fact and accepted that in addition to military and armed attacks, including 
terrorism, also severe economic crises which reach a certain level of gravity so as to endanger the 
existence and integrity of the country affected may be covered by this or similar notions.36 In this 
respect, the award granted in the case LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E 
International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic of 2006 explicitly manifested that, 
“To conclude that such a severe economic crisis could not constitute an essential security 
interest is to diminish the havoc that the economy can wreak on the lives of an entire 
population and the ability of the Government to lead. When a State’s economic foundation 
is under siege, the severity of the problem can equal that of any military invasion”.37 
Also the award in the case Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic of 2008 
stressed that,  
“… international law is not blind to the requirement that States should be able to exercise 
their sovereignty in the interest of their population free from internal as well as external 
threats to their security and the maintenance of a peaceful domestic order. It is well known 
that the concept of international security of States in the Post World War II international 
order was intended to cover not only political and military security but also the economic 
security of States and of their population.”38 
Thus, “security” is no longer solely linked to the preservation of the integrity of the territory of 
individual states and of their nationals from foreign military attacks.39 Among some other facts, 
and in addition to the traditional focalization of the notion of “security” in relation to one specific 
state and its territory, the ideas of international security or of human security as distinct objects 
of security not referred to a single state have now arisen.40 Moreover, the technological revolution 
has led to the overcoming of the understanding of borders as purely geographical realities, and to 
the correlative appearance of new threats that are characterized both by the fact that not only the 
territory of the state is the target of the threat but also because states are not the only addressees 
of the threat. The case of cybersecurity and cyber threats would be paradigmatic to this respect.41  
Consequently, the notions of “security” and “national security” have expanded in a necessary 
attempt to accommodate new threats and challenges. The absence of military actions and war 
                                                          
35 Like self-defense as regards terrorist threats. Note N LUBELL, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State 
Actors, OUP, Oxford 2010, p 29ff; H KELSEN, above 33, 791-792.  
36 M BARBIERI, above n 9, p 131; D COLLINS, The BRIC States and Outward Foreign Direct Investment, OUP, 
Oxford 2013, pp 176-177. 
37 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Award of 03.10.2006 (Decision on Liability) <www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0460.pdf> accessed 29.10.2017, para 238, at p 70. 
38 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award of 05.09.2008 
<www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf> accessed 22.10.2017, para 175, at p 76. 
Significantly both cases related to the severe financial crisis that Argentina underwent in the last decade of the 20th 
Century and they gave importance to different outcomes as to the assessment of the relevance of that crisis for the 
national interest of the state (See UNCTAD, above 8, pp 9-10; JE VIÑUALES, ’Sovereignty in Foreign Investment 
Law’ in Z DOUGLAS, J PAUWELYN and JE VIÑUALES JE (eds), The Foundations of International Investment Law 
Bringing Theory into Practice, OUP, Oxford, 2014, p 347). 
39 A WOLFERS, above n 2, 484. 
40 Note H NASU, above n 4, 16-17 & 22-24. 
41 H NASU, above n 4, 18; S SAHA, ‘CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National Security Review Frameworks as 
a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the Age of Globalization’ (2012) 33:1 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 199, 206-208. 




among nations does not ensure on its own security and peace for the state or for the international 
community. New sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian or ecological fields 
have now become threats to peace and security.42 Non-traditional threats arise and they now cover 
issues like economic security, energy and resource security, environmental security, food 
security, bio-security or health security, among other areas.43  
The presence of the notion of national economic security –like in the PRC- or the debate that has 
arisen in some countries of the world as regards it –in the US or the EU- shows the relevance and 
breadth of the notion of security nowadays, as well as the potential risks that the reference to 
broad notions such as the one of economic security may have in areas like FDI. It may pose 
protectionist threats in so far as it can be used by states to prevent the acquisition of certain sectors 
of the economy by foreigners instead of blocking FDI proposals that may potentially or effectively 
harm the national security of the host country.44 
National security strategies acknowledge this change of approach and the dynamic nature of 
“security” and “national security” and go beyond the military threat by focusing also on individual 
citizens and their way of life. The analysis of the national security strategies or national defence 
strategies of some major countries of the world corroborate the use of the term national security 
as the central idea on which they stand45 as well as the evolving condition of the concept that is 
not limited to military threats any longer.46 In the UK, for example, the National Security Strategy 
and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom 
explicitly states that “National Security Objective 1 is to protect our people – at home, in our 
Overseas Territories and abroad, and to protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure 
and way of life”.47 This idea of protecting nations and citizens is included on a regular basis in 
many national security and defence strategies of states around the world.48  
Additionally, almost all of them show the usual absence of a clear definition of the concept of 
national security; in some cases, no definition is provided at all. In Germany, for instance, the 
Germany Defence Policies of 201149 refers to national security on many occasions but instead of 
enshrining a definition of what it actually means makes a broad call to Germany’s security 
objectives –“the security and protection of German citizens; - the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Germany and its allies; - the fulfilment of international responsibilities”- and to 
German security interests.50 Also the afore-mentioned UK National Security Strategy and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom lacks 
any definition of national security. It merely focuses on the values to be preserved without 
                                                          
42 UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Forty-Sixth Meeting, 
UN Doc. S/PV.3046 (Provisional), of 31.01.1992 <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20SPV%203046.pdf> accessed 04.11.2017, p 143. 
43 H NASU, above n 4, 18-19. 
44 Vid. PT MUCHLINSKI, ‘Trends in International Investment Agreements: Balancing Investor Rights and the Right 
to Regulate: The Issue of National Security’ (2008-9) 1 Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy (2008–
2009) 37, 55. 
45 OECD, above n 13, p 11.  
46 Note to this respect, OECD, above n 13, Annex 3, p 42 
47 HM GOVERNMENT, above n 21, para 1.10 at p 11. 
48 OECD, above n 13, p 11 and Table 1 at p 13.  
49 FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, Germany: Defence Policy Guidelines 2011. Safeguarding National 
Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together, Berlin, 28.05.2011 
<http://www.nato.diplo.de/contentblob/3150944/Daten/1318881/VM_deMaiziere_180511_eng_DLD.pdf> accessed 
22.10.2017. 
50 “German security interests include: - preventing, mitigating and managing crises and conflicts that endanger the 
security of Germany and its allies; - advocating and implementing positions on foreign and security policy in an 
assertive and credible way; - strengthening transatlantic and European security and partnership; - advocating the 
universality of human rights and principles of democracy, promoting global respect for international law and reducing 
the gap between the rich and the poor regions of the world; - facilitating free and unrestricted world trade as well as 
free access to the high seas and to natural resources” (FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, above n 49, p 4).  




providing any notion or definition of the term: “Our security, prosperity and freedom are 
interconnected and mutually supportive. They constitute our national interest”.51  
This same absence of definition of the concept of national security is encountered in the US 
National Security Strategy February 2015. In this case, the national security of the US would 
involve  “primarily (but not only) military security, namely the protection of the defense industrial 
base and critical technologies that provide a military advantage, as well as more broadly the 
protection of assets that constitute critical infrastructure”.52 
Some isolated examples of a definition of what national security is and means are also 
encountered worldwide. For instance, the Spanish National Security Strategy. Sharing a Common 
Project defines national security as “the State action aimed at protecting the freedom and well-
being of its citizens, guaranteeing the defence of Spain and its constitutional principles and values, 
and contributing together with our partners and allies to international security in compliance with 
the commitments undertaken.”53 A much broader definition is embodied in the Russia’s National 
Security Strategy to 2020 where national security is, for instance, defined as “the protection of 
the individual, society and the State from domestic and foreign threats, which in turn ensures 
constitutional rights and freedoms, an appropriate quality of life for citizens, sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and stable development of the Russian Federation, the defence and security of 
the State.”54 Consequently, a threat to the national security would be understood as “the direct or 
indirect possibility of damage to constitutional rights and freedoms, quality of life, 
sovereignty/territorial integrity, stable development of the Russian Federation, defence and 
security of the State.”55  
 
3. The multidimensional scope of national security: A single notion or some autonomous but 
related sectoral notions? The case of energy security and critical infrastructures protection. 
As stated, the concept of national security becomes increasingly complex and coexists now with 
sectoral notions referring to particular individual national security areas and aspects. The global 
ideas of “security” or of “national security” become related in certain cases to some autonomous 
notions of “security” specifically referring to some areas of society and of the economy of a 
particular country.  
National security is an ill-defined term whose content may vary depending on the country and the 
moment when it is ascertained and the specific sector, even the specific firm or infrastructure 
referred to. Whether a single notion of “national security” or some of them exist with different 
contours, underlying principles and goals depending on the specific field referred to, is something 
to be determined on a case by case basis. Moreover, national security gets its own meaning from 
a social, economic or environmental standpoint and may potentially vary in reference to foreign 
                                                          
51 HM GOVERNMENT, above n 21, para 2.12 at p 22. 
52 KP SAUVANT, FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise, Policy Research Working Paper 5052, The World Bank Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management Network, International Trade Department, World Bank Washington, September 
2009, p 8. 
53 PRESIDENCIA DEL GOBIERNO, The National Security Strategy. Sharing a Common Project, Madrid, 2013, p 6. 
54 PRESIDENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Russia´s National Security Strategy to 2020, Approved by 
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 12.05.2009 No. 537, No 6 (Unofficial Russian version 
<http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020> accessed 28.10.2017). 
55 Above n 54, No 6. The Peoples’ Republic of China Military Strategy speaks of China's national strategic goal being 
“to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the CPC celebrates its 
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and harmonious by 2049 when the People's Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary.” (STATE COUNCIL OF 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, China's Military Strategy, Beijing, 05.2015, p 5). 




investment. This elusive and multidimensional understanding has a direct effect on the control of 
FDI on national security grounds.  
New sectoral notions of “security” arise which respond to the singularities and policies of some 
particular sectors of the economy and which are autonomous from the global idea of “security” 
and of “national security” of a certain state. Notions like “national energy security”, “national 
economic security” –a concept that exists in countries like the PRC,56 and that receives also some 
support to be adopted in the US or in the EU-57 or of “national food security”,58 among some 
others, are now referred to. All of them are linked to the basic idea of the preservation of the 
national security of the host country in particular fields of different size, nature and relevance, in 
which some specific policies and necessities of protection exist. All of them require the global 
concept of national security to be adapted to a particular area and situation of the host state. As 
well as making necessary the determination of the intrinsic relationship of any of these 
autonomous sectoral concepts of security with the global concept of national security. 
The absence of a clear definition of the notion and the difficulties to actually reach one multiply 
when referring to the other security related notions in use. For instance, the determination of the 
meaning of “national economic security” or of “economic threats” is objectively difficult because 
risk, aggressive competition and uncertainty are what actually characterize the normal condition 
of actors in a market economy.59 This makes it very difficult to differentiate what can be 
understood as a threat to the economic security of a country and what is only the consequence of 
the normal functioning of the economy and which must therefore be accepted (although to what 
extent?). In fact, the current economic crisis has confronted states with the difficult task of 
determining which areas of their economies should be preserved from FDI and which others 
should not. 
FDI is subject to a growing scrutiny by national authorities with some areas of the economy being 
especially relevant nowadays as regards the control of foreign investment on national security 
grounds: telecommunications and technology, energy or critical infrastructures are some of them. 
The lack of a clear understanding of what “national economic security” means and the pressure 
from public opinion and the media may in certain cases also invite politicians of certain states to 
control some inwards FDI fearing that it will lead to losses of jobs or to a lowering of social rights 
in the host country. The issue is to determine whether this control is exercised on grounds of 
protection of the “national economic security” or it is just reflection of an economic protectionist 
attitude.  
Each one of these sectoral categories of “security” defines a focal point within the security issue 
as well as a way of ordering priorities. The content of these new threats is to be constructed 
autonomously although they are not independent and a strong network of linkages exists among 
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and China’ (2012) 34:5 Sydney Law Review 5, 5. 
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‘Foreign Direct Investment in the United States and Canada: Fractured Neoliberalism and the Regulatory Imperative’ 
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Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Countries (prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat by the 
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them. The relationship existing between energy, climate and security are a good example of that.60 
Also the dependence of military security on economic security in so far it is finally dependent on 
budget constraints is significant.61 In many cases, their combination provides a new approach to 
security deeply linked to the idea of resilience. “Security” as a part of “national security” is a 
major element in modern societies which becomes increasingly linked to, and supplemented by, 
the notion of resilience, “the capacity to withstand and rebound from disruptive challenges or 
adverse effects”.62 Its translation into the area of FDI implies the need to control foreign 
investment in certain critical infrastructures, industries and sectors of the economy to allow the 
implementation of regulatory powers and to fulfil  basic goals towards citizens.  
Among the potential collection of national security dimensions and, maybe, of national security 
concepts, energy constitutes a perfect test bench for many issues related to the control of foreign 
investment by host states in some particular areas of their economy. It is an independent notion 
that is very much linked to other sectors like that of the protection of national critical 
infrastructures.  
Despite the relevance of many areas of the economy not all of them have given importance to the 
existence of an individualized area for security as energy or critical infrastructure do. This is, for 
instance, ascertainable in the US where the notion of critical infrastructure has a direct effect on 
foreign investment in the energy sector. Among the factors to be considered by the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFUS) when assessing the national security dimension 
of a FDI proposal reference is made to “(6) the potential national security-related effects on 
United States critical infrastructure, including major energy assets”.63 It is the only sector 
mentioned within this broad notion of critical infrastructure. 
Energy security and the protection of national critical infrastructures are two different but 
interrelated dimensions of “security” and “national security”. The determination of their exact 
meaning and scope and of their dynamic relationship are prime examples of the difficulty in 
assessing a single and comprehensive notion of “national security”. And of the evaluation of their 
potential impact in the area of FDI. 
 
3.1. National energy security.  
National security has traditionally been equated with the ability of countries to thwart armed 
aggression. However, as stated, the notion has changed over time and has also being enlarged. 
Currently, national security also embraces, among other concepts, a threat to national energy 
security.64 Many states are now well aware of this fact, to the extent that during the last few years 
investment in this sector –especially oil and gas- has been exposed to “national security” or 
national “essential security interests” concerns. Different restrictions have been introduced in 
some countries for foreign investment in this area and many FDI projects have been subject to 
prior scrutiny on “national security” grounds.65 
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61 M STONE, above n 32, p 5.  
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Energy is the world’s most capital intensive industry.66 Energy security constitutes a core element 
of energy policy that has gained increased attention in the last few years.67 Its understanding is 
based on the concept of security “in general”, however, the term lacks a common and clear 
understanding and is absent of guiding principles.68 Many different definitions of what it means 
are provided.69 Additionally, its meaning has evolved over time. It is defined both as “slippery”, 
because of the difficulties to universally define or conceptualize it, and “multi-dimensional”,70 in 
so far as the traditional political economic approach to oil supply for western industrialized 
countries has now given way to a much broader and complex reality addressing a plurality of 
sectors and challenges.71  
3.1.1. Energy security: a notion linked to energy supply and energy availability.  
Leaving aside its connection with the physical –natural, in many cases linked to climate changes, 
or technical aspects- “risks” that the supply of energy may encounter,72 energy security has 
traditionally been linked to the idea of supply of energy, stressing the dimension of its economic 
risk. The International Energy Agency has focussed on this idea of market supply and energy 
availability at market price and it understands “energy security” as “the uninterrupted availability 
of energy sources at an affordable price”.73 Resting on this approach the notion would then be of 
special relevance to energy consuming or net importer countries.74  
However, the notion of energy security is constantly reshaped in accordance to the moment in 
which it is evaluated and the country or region to which reference is made. Further, the notion of 
energy security has been modified in recent times to include new and additional dimensions not 
covered so far. Under the traditional market-centric definition of energy security the idea of 
assurance of adequate and reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in a way that does 
not jeopardize major national values and goals75 would be stressed. But the notion has evolved as 
energy necessities of states develop too.  
Nowadays it is both much broader, in so far as additional dimensions of energy security are taken 
into account when approaching it, and it is also the subject of a continuous and intense re-
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examination.76 The notion becomes increasingly comprehensive as it attempts to tackle the 
several challenges that exist for energy security.77 Thus, it certainly refers to the availability, 
accessibility, affordability and acceptability of energy, the well-known “four As” of energy 
security,78 and not only in relation to oil but also to other sorts of energies. But it also points to 
the diversification of energy suppliers or the geostrategic threats and vulnerabilities that this may 
generate.79  
In accordance with this position, energy security would then be directly linked to the concept of 
“security of energy supply”80. It would be equated to self-sufficiency or “energy independence” 
of the state81 and, more recently, to the need to reduce dependence on fossil fuel consumption.82  
Consequently the notion of security would be connected to the short-term disruption of supply –
“shocks”- and long-term problems –“stresses”- for this supply.83  
This description of energy security has been broadly accepted,84 although it has also changed over 
time because of the new challenges national and international energy policies are facing.85 It is 
still directly linked to the reliability and affordability of energy supply in general,86 but it has 
evolved from the classical former idea of stable supply of cheap oil87 to that of “energy supply 
continuity”.88 This change implies an additional degree of difficulty and complexity in so far as 
many and important differences exist between the oil, gas, nuclear or electricity energy markets89 
                                                          
76 A CHERP and J JEWELL, above n 70, 415; L CHESTER, above n 70, p 159. 
77 D VON HIPPEL, T SUZUKI, JH WILLIAMS et al, above n 68, 6722. 
78 Note ASIA PACIFIC ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE, A Quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century Resources and Constraints, 
APERC, Tokyo 2007, pp 7-42; L CHESTER, above n 70, p 164; A CHERP and J JEWELL, above n 70, 415-418 with a critical 
analysis in depth of these four principles. Also, S BELOW, above n 68, 861 who speaks of the existence of some commonly accepted 
“dimensions” to depict what energy security means: affordability, availability, efficiency, technological development, sustainability 
and regulation. 
79 In this line, and within the EU, Rec 3 of Directive 2004/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11.02.2004 on the 
promotion of cogeneration based on a useful heat demand in the internal energy market and amending Directive 94/42/EEC [2004] 
OJ L52/50, following the Green Paper - Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply (COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Green Paper - Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply, COM/2000/0769 
final) recognizes that “security of supply should not be conceived as merely a question of reducing import dependency and boosting 
domestic production. Security of supply calls for a wide range of policy initiatives aimed at, inter alia, diversification of sources and 
technologies and improved international relations.” Also consider Rec 22 of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 13.07.2009, concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC 
[2009] OJ L 211/94, which as regards gas explicitly states that, the “security of supply of energy to the Community requires, in 
particular, an assessment of the independence of network operation, the level of the Community’s and individual Member States’ 
dependence on energy supply from third countries, and the treatment of both domestic and foreign trade and investment in energy in 
a particular third country.” 
80 Ch WINZER, above n 69, 36. A secure energy supply would imply “the continuous uninterrupted availability of energy at the 
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which are explicitly accepted in some national energy strategies.90 And it also requires an effective 
quantitative measurement of energy security.91  
3.1.2. The changing understanding of energy security. 
However, even resting on this main idea of supply, the concept of energy security enjoys a high 
degree of relativity and changeability. How it is finally conceptualized is relative, context-
dependent and a matter of perception by the actor approaching it.92 Energy security may finally 
mean different things in different places –a country, a continent, a region-,93 energy markets94 or 
to different people in some parts of the world. And within them, for producers, large and small 
consumers, developing and developed countries, energy importing or energy exporting countries, 
companies operating in a network, policy makers or other energy stakeholders.95 They may all 
consider different aspects of energy security and provide diverse definitions and approaches to 
the notion.96  
Also the temporal element is to be taken into account in so far as risks and responses may vary in 
the short, medium and long term.97 For example, PRC oil’s dependence ranged at around 51.3% 
of its demand in 2010 and is expected to rise up to 85,6% by 2035.98 On the contrary, in 2015 
only around 24% of the petroleum consumed by the United States was imported from foreign 
countries, the lowest level since 1970.99 From the traditional definition approach of energy 
security the US would be a more energy secure country whereas China would have a more 
insecure position.100 
Energy security has also gained an additional geostrategic dimension that although has always 
been present in this area is now even more relevant and noticeable, and consequently enhances 
its “security” dimension.101 It may be the time to speak of “geopolitics of energy” instead of 
“energy security” is coming.102 The notion is then linked to new aspects of the energy supply like 
security of demand or security of transit and transport103 and also to other fully new dimensions 
of energy security that have gained relevance over time like the environmental impact of energy 
sources and choices, climate change, innovation of energy research and development or energy 
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poverty.104 Reference is not only then made to the nature of the risks105 but also to their sources 
and to their origin.106 All these facts, among others, affect the traditionally vital role played by 
governments in this area as providers, regulators and owners of networked infrastructures107 and 
introduce new elements, actors and geometries into the security scene,108 which impacts on the 
understanding of the notion and are increasingly taken into account in different ways by national 
energy security strategies. For instance, the UK Energy Security Strategy identifies several 
“cross-cutting risks” in this area: major domestic disruption to energy supply and major 
international disruptions to energy supply, increased international energy prices and insufficient 
investment in UK energy infrastructure.109 
Energy security has risen in relevance because of the growing habitual dependence of 
industrialized and emerging economies on imported energy consumption, the increasing potential 
for frequent disruption in supply and emerging issues and risks for accessing energy.110 Thus, for 
instance, the Green Paper - Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply, 
although it still speaks of energy supply, identifies several different risks for energy security: 
physical, economic, social and environmental risks.111 And the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on European Energy Security Strategy 
stresses the geostrategic dimension of energy security and insists on the idea of coordinating 
national energy policies and on the necessity for the EU to speak “with one voice in external 
energy policy”.112 Also, in the PRC, “security energy supply through international co-operation” 
was considered one of the six major areas of focus at the first meeting of the Chinese State 
Council-level National energy Commission.113 
 
3.2. Energy security and its links with the protection of critical infrastructures.  
The achievement of energy security, a very relevant piece within the whole concept of national 
security, has now become, with increasing strength, an integrated part of the foreign and defence 
policy of many countries,114 a foreign policy instrument that has always existed but that now gains 
further relevance, and affects the attitude towards, for example, FDI, both inwards and 
outwards.115 The separation of economics and politics in the area of energy has today come to an 
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end. A struggle for energy exists nowadays and national energy security becomes intrinsically 
geopolitical;116 strategic and geopolitical interests and approaches are currently playing a key role 
in this area, and in so far as they interplay and dynamically influence each other they affect the 
achievement of energy security and also, its understanding.117 For example, and from an EU 
standpoint, the  dependence of the EU on the provision of gas from Russia and the successive 
Ukrainian-Russian crisis has clearly shown this interdependence that now is explicitly taken into 
account by the EU118 and other countries like the US in its National Security Strategy 2015119 The 
risk of the use of energy as a political weapon is clear for Europe.120  
No static or “one-size-fits-all” solution exists as regards the content and understanding of the 
notion of energy security.121 The chief concern for energy security is vulnerability to politically 
motivated disruption:122 However, the final response provided will be dependent on the 
formulation of three essential questions: Security for whom? Security for which values? And 
security from what threats?123 Depending on the responses granted to these three questions, 
security energy could be understood as referring broadly to the low vulnerability of vital energy 
systems of a nation.124  
The concept of “vital energy systems” addresses the central question of what to protect and refers 
to energy resources, technologies or infrastructure uses linked together by energy flows that 
support critical social functions.125 That implies a direct link to the notions of critical 
infrastructure and resilience. Ensuring energy security of the state would also mean ensuring the 
control and functioning of some critical infrastructures. And the notion of vulnerability of these 
vital energy systems combines exposure to risks and resilience capacities.126  
The concept of critical infrastructure varies from country to country. However, and in accordance 
with the OECD, a common understanding of critical infrastructure would involve any “physical 
or intangible assets whose destruction or disruption would seriously undermine public safety, 
social order and the fulfilment of key government responsibilities. Such damage would generally 
be catastrophic and far-reaching” and will depend either on natural or man-made risks.127 
Criticality is usually referred to any infrastructure that provides “an essential support for economic 
and well-being, for public safety and for the functioning of key government responsibilities”.128 
This is expressed in different ways in several countries. To this respect, legislation in Germany 
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speaks when asserting this critical condition of “a relative measure of the importance of a given 
infrastructure in terms of the impact of its disruption or functional failure on the security of supply, 
i.e. providing society with important goods and services.”129 Canada refers to “processes, systems, 
facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or 
economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government”.130  
This new content of the notion implies a further shift in the approach to it and a growing reference 
to establish complex policies and measures to strategically manage potential risks that can affect 
all elements of energy systems.131 Not only reference to the sovereignty dimension of energy 
security132 or to the risk exposure of the system and its vulnerabilities would be made, but also to 
the resilience of the whole system in an environment of securitization.133  
Many national security strategies refer now to energy within the list of critical infrastructures to 
be protected. For instance, the EU Directive of 2008 on the identification and designation of 
European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, to 
which the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
European Energy Security Strategies explicitly refers,134 embodies under the headings of 
“energy”: electricity (infrastructures and facilities for generation and transmission of electricity 
in respect of supply electricity), oil (Oil production, refining, treatment, storage and transmission 
by pipelines) and gas (Gas production, refining, treatment, storage and transmission by pipelines 
and LNG terminals). And reference to the “resilience of the European gas system” is made by the 
EU.135 Also NATO is willing to “enhance its strategic awareness of energy developments with 
security implications; (and to) develop its competence in supporting the protection of critical 
energy infrastructure...”.136  
The list of critical infrastructures is widening overtime137 and becoming broader in its 
interpretation.138 This trend to enlarge its understanding generates additional problems. In 
addition to the physical protection against potential risks and threats, the protection of critical 
infrastructures encounters a relevant FDI dimension which is ascertainable in some national FDI 
screening systems. The process of liberalization undertaken during the last few decades has led 
many critical infrastructures to be owned by private owners, in some cases foreigners. In almost 
every country critical infrastructures are in many cases privately owned, and for their proper 
protection the full cooperation between the public administration and private undertakers is 
required.139 In the US, for instance, 85% of critical infrastructures are said to be privately 
owned.140 Property of these critical infrastructures, many of them linked to the energy sector, may 
be transferred to foreigners through M&As operations. This requires in some cases the 
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implementation of a process of evaluation by national authorities of FDI proposals in certain 
sectors of the economy or specific infrastructures and assets to determine whether their 
prospective acquisition may threaten, or not, the national security of the host state.  
This directly poses the question of the interrelation between energy security and the protection of 
critical infrastructures as two different realities, and their interplay with and within the global 
notion of “national security”. An issue that is already present in the US in relation to the evaluation 
by CFIUS of foreign investment projects on national security grounds. Some of the most relevant 
security concerns associated with foreign investments refer to the preservation of critical 
infrastructures, a kind of independent area of concern within the general rubric of “essential 
security interests” or “national security”.141 But what a critical infrastructure is, constitutes 
something far from being well-established.  
Critical infrastructures and their protection are closely related to other dimensions of national 
security like, for instance, energy and telecommunications. Especially, energy investment is 
unique due to the particularly long risk exposure, the very intense capital investment and the acute 
project risk.142 To what extent the protection of critical infrastructures in the area of energy is a 
manifestation of the new and broad notion of energy security or is independent of the previous 
and constitutes an example of the protection of critical infrastructures? Or which level of 
interrelation with the global notion of “national security” exists are issues to be determined in 
every country. The absence in many cases of clear definitions in this respect may potentially 
generate uncertainty when they are used in the area of FDI.   
What constitutes critical infrastructure and its necessary protection, and what constitutes energy 
security is something to be determined by every nation when evaluating FDI projects. Reality 
shows that their differentiation is not easy and that their broad interpretation provides the state 
with a multi-tiered instrument to control FDI. Whether measures finally adopted by the state 
constitute protective measures on “national security” or national “essential security interests” 
grounds or hidden protectionist measures adopted in the name of economic patriotism, economic 
national security or similar terms is difficult to assess, with no guarantee of success, on a case by 
case basis. 
 
4. The multi-dimensional notion of national security. 
The notion of national security is complex and multidimensional. It is also subject to constant 
evolution. It has now expanded to cover situations not directly linked to its traditional military 
dimension. Foreign Direct Investment is becoming one of those fields in which the issue of 
national security is gaining relevance. Non-traditional threats arise and they now cover issues like 
economic security, energy and resource security, environmental security, food security, bio-
security or health security, among other areas. National security lacks a clear understanding and 
it currently defragmented in different national security notions. This makes necessary the 
determination of the specific relationship of any of these autonomous sectoral concepts of security 
with the global concept of national security, as well as the specification of the ways to protect 
them. 
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